By ALLEN R. SANDERSON
Back
in February, Yahoo president and CEO Marissa Mayer created a brief
firestorm with her directive to company colleagues that they would no
longer be permitted to work from home. They would have to change from
pajamas and slippers into whatever constitutes business attire in
California and now clock-in at the office.
This specific
policy decision is actually one part of a larger subject in
economics—cases of asymmetric information, situations in which one party
in a transaction, whether it be employer or employee, car buyer or
seller, or prospective spouse is relatively more well-informed than the
other, or possesses private information that he or she may not want to
divulge.
“Adverse selection,” “moral hazard,” and “principal-agent” are names given to such circumstances and predictable behaviors.
In adverse-selection situations a sample of products or people may not
be representative of the population as a whole. For example, it has to
cross the mind of an insurance agent talking to someone who wants to buy
a $1 million life insurance policy: What is there about this person
that I do not know that would change the odds of a healthy-looking
40-year-old male not living to age 80? Thus the agent poses questions
about the applicant’s family history (“Are your parents still living?”
and if the answer is no, then: “At what age did they die and from what
cause?”) and would require a physical exam. Whether the person is a
smoker or likes to skydive are other considerations. And policies
preclude the company from having to pay beneficiaries should the policy
holder commit suicide, a complementary way to deal with this
informational deficiency.
The tendency of an imperfectly
monitored employee to shirk—Go on, admit it: You’ve done it!— brings up
moral-hazard and principal-agent problems, as well as questions of how
to structure compensation to align incentives to ensure that the worker
is acting in the best interests of the employer or firm. Slacking off or
taking on-the-job leisure time is always a concern when monitoring is
difficult for the “principal” and/or the “agent” can’t be trusted. (The
same is true for a firm’s stockholders—the principals—in ensuring that
the CEO and the Board of Directors— the agents—do what is in the best
interests of investors and not be squandering resources on expensive art
work, travel, or relatives.)
In restaurants in the United
States, discretionary tipping is one way to ensure that the servers—the
agents – contribute to a positive experience for diners that will lead
to repeat business, something the owner —the principal—counts on for
long-term viability. In a college classroom setting, examinations and
taking attendance are means through which the principal —the
instructor—can coax agents—students—into mastering the material. Signs
on cash registers at some take-out eateries, like Dunkin Donuts or
O’Hare concessions, that indicate your purchase is free if you do not
get a receipt, is a way to keep employees from stealing from the
franchise’s owner (who is likely not present) by not ringing up the
transaction.
This is less of a problem when information is
readily available or observable—new cars, with ample reviews, word of
mouth, and Internet price information, or a coach and his/her players.
It can be a problem in the used-car, used-house or used-spouse markets,
though in many cases private inspections and contract clauses can be
used to address them.
For Yahoo, Mayer may have suspected
that a non-negligible fraction of her at-home employees were spending
too much time playing with their dogs or managing their fantasy league
teams. Or she may have felt that there are creative, productive
synergies from having her employees interact with each other in formal
meetings and water-cooler conversations.
Sometimes
compensation can be structured—piece-rate pay, performance bonuses—to
address principal-agent and moral-hazard problems. And technologies that
allow an employer to track performance and activity, such as tracking
keystrokes, video surveillance or installing GPS devices, are modern
ways of monitoring.
In Chicago, scandals involving criminal
misconduct and rampant corruption, including torturing and framing those
in custody, have plagued the police department in recent years. In 2012
alone taxpayers had to shell out $22.5 million in one settlement and
$10.25 million in another, plus millions of dollars in legal fees to
defend these officers. Perhaps CPD contracts could be structured such
that their members would have to pay for these aberrant behaviors from
their own pension funds. That would be one way to re-align the
incentives. Or appoint Ms. Mayer our police chief!